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3XEOLFVSKHUHVSXEOLF,VODPDQGPRGHUQLWLHV
 
This report presents papers and discussions from the workshop “Public spheres, public Islam 
and modernities”, which took place on October 24th and 25th 2002 at the University of 
Bielefeld. The Workshop was organised by the Sociology of Development Research Centre 
(SDRC) and was realised in co-operation with the Italian sociologist and expert in Islamic 
Studies Dr. Armando Salvatore, who was invited by the International Graduate School in 
Sociology (IGSS) as a special guest and resource person. Armando Salvatore is lecturer at the 
Institute of Social Science at the Humboldt University in Berlin, and formerly worked at the 
European University of Florence. The workshop was attended by approximately 25 
participants. The presentations given by the guests, staff members, doctoral students and post 
docs of the Research Centre were based on empirical fieldwork in Muslim societies and 
raised questions about the specific constitution of the public sphere in these contexts and the 
importance of political religion in a globalised world. Methodological issues such as 
comparative sociology and theoretical issues such as the classical concepts of public sphere 
and social space were re-problematised and discussed from a critical post-colonial 
perspective, taking into account the historical conditions of processes of knowledge 
production, which underlie these concepts.  
 
%ULQJLQJ VRFLRORJ\ EDFN LQWRGHYHORSPHQW3XEOLF6SKHUH&LYLO 6RFLHW\DQG*HQGHU 
&XUUHQW'HEDWHVDWWKH6RFLRORJ\RI'HYHORSPHQW5HVHDUFK&HQWUH

The workshop was opened by *XGUXQ/DFKHQPDQQ
 
 who gave a general introduction to the 
concepts of public sphere and civil society, in order to discuss their ongoing significance in the 
research about Muslim societies, but also their shortcomings and contradictions. She focused on 
the way these concepts are used in the work of Bielefeld researchers and paid special attention 
to the concept of social space.  
 
Methodologically much of the research done at the Sociology of Development Research Center 
(SDRC) in Bielefeld is based on the approach of Grounded Theory (Strauss, 1987; Strauss/ 
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Corbin, 1990), whereby theory is developed out of concrete empirical studies. Regarding studies 
of Muslim societies, especially the Muslim countries in Africa and Asia that belong to the 
Muslim periphery are brought to the forefront. Hence comparative research on topics as public 
sphere and civil society are given centrality in a sociology of Islam, as Georg Stauth holds it 
(Stauth, 1995).  
 
Epistemologically, comparative research is linked to the reflection on the ethnocentricity and 
eurocentricity of analytical or even political concepts. The problem of transferring these 
concepts from one context to another is experienced not only in development sociology but 
also in social anthropology and ethnology. Here what Stauth calls ‘comparative sociology of 
civilisations’, has to be overcome as it stresses the possibility of doing comparative sociology 
by using normative concepts which are supposed to be transferred from the West to other 
civilisations. A non normative comparative perspective is achieved, Lachenmann argued, 
through the conscious reflection on processes of knowledge production. This means to take 
into account from whose point of view this knowledge is produced and pronounced. The 
political and ethical importance of epistemic communities in a globalised world becomes very 
clear. This approach is still remarkably different from mainstream globalisation theory, where 
such reflections are missing and comparisons are made without taking into account the 
different contexts of the studies. In Bielefeld however, Lachenmann stressed, it is exactly the 
contextualisation of empirical material and case studies, which allows a fruitful comparative 
perspective. As one example Lachenmann mentioned the well known debate about modes of 
production and modes of articulation, which evolved in Marxist economic anthropology out 
of concrete research about West Africa, and which was clearly followed in Bielefeld and had 
deeply influenced the research program of the SDRC.  
 
Lachenmann continued extrapolating her notion of public sphere and civil society. She 
remarked that in the past, researchers at the SDRC would not have dared to use the term 
public sphere with regard to any of the countries they were studying, because the term that 
was HQ YRJXH was civil society. The term civil society was introduced more as a political 
concept and is still being used in a kind of global jargon for all non-governmental 
organisations and for a might be public sphere as an actor. Lachenmann criticised this 
                                                                
1
 Gudrun Lachenmann is professor of Sociology of Development (“Women and Gender in Developing 
  3
normative use of the term, stressing rather the notion of civil society as a sociological 
analytical concept without having to give it a normative connotation as a political concept. 
She claimed that civil society is a useful concept and the relationship between civil society 
and the public sphere should be worked out more in detail. 
 
Departing from Habermas’ work on the public sphere (Habermas, 1987), which lately has 
been rediscovered by many scholars, she pleads for a critical re-reading of these texts. While 
Habermas brings the public sphere and the civil society together, Lachenmann argues for a 
conceptual separation of these two terms. She maintains that the two terms, public sphere and 
civil society, are not identical, civil society is rather a constituting force of publicness 
(Bierschenk/ Elwert/ Kohnert, 1993) producing a public forum or a public sphere. It is this 
publicness that can be analysed and discussed. The other issue of contestation is the critique 
of Habermas. This critique holds that the latter’s concept of public sphere is profoundly 
related to and rooted in a special phase of European bourgeois history, that is the 19th century, 
and therefore no valid category of analysis for current social dynamics in a globalised world. 
She stressed the merits of the feminist scholars who pointed out the shortcomings of a theory 
that distinguished so clearly between the public and the private sphere and thereafter went on 
to reduce the women to the private sphere. Although this reduction has done a lot of damage 
in theoretical thought, it should not lead to a complete rejection of Habermasian theory. 
Firstly, because Habermas acknowledges his gender and historical blindness, and secondly 
because for him and his historical analysis, the private sphere included the economy, that is, 
the entrepreneurs and owners of private property. Under the slogan “the private is political” 
feminist scholars criticised and tried to deconstruct the dualistic view on the private and the 
public sphere, showing how closely these two were interrelated and how the so called private 
sphere had been created and shaped by the state.  
 
Relating to research about social movements, Lachenmann connected the concept of civil 
society to that of social space as used in Bielefeld research. Social spaces can be elements that 
constitute a non homogeneous public sphere, one that does not come up with one common 
public interest, since individuals do not have the same predispositions to participate in this 
public space. In Bielefeld the term ‘space‘ is applied in the sense of social space, that is in a 
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relatively non institutionalised delineation. It goes beyond concepts of community, place or 
territorial or physical space. The concept of social space is clearly linked to agency, to the 
production of gender specific and culturally defined meanings. The concept of female spaces 
is a useful empirical concept with a very special theoretical background, whereby one can 
analyse agency and not merely actors. Although Lachenmann was not completely sure about 
her own suggestion to use social space as an operationalisation of life-world she stressed the 
parallels between the merely theoretical term life world, coming from phenomenological and 
interpretative sociology dealing with the social construction of reality and the empirical 
concept of social spaces. Both have the same theoretical and conceptualising frame of agency 
and deal with producing spaces of social meaning beyond a mere logic of inclusion or 
exclusion . 
 
The concept of social spaces can be fruitfully related to a whole brunch of sociological 
concepts: to the term life world, which Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann had introduced 
long ago in their sociology of everyday life (Schütz/ Luckmann, 1973); to the term milieu, 
which is used by other phenomenologists like Grathoff; to the new concepts like translocal or 
transnational linkages, flows, landscapes, processes of community construction and networks 
as used by social anthropologists like Appadurai (Appadurai, 1996); to works on translocal or 
transnational public spheres amongst different epistemic communities, showing that here 
might exist multiple public spheres like there are multiple modernities, and multiple Islams 
like there are multiple feminisms. 
 
Furthermore, the connection to the sociology of knowledge is very important for the analysis 
of Muslim societies, as it brings in the dimension of social distribution of knowledge. When 
analysing gender relations and working conditions in a Muslim country like Bangladesh with 
the system of purdah it is necessary to take into account the societal context. When analysing 
development processes it is necessary to look at Western knowledge which is being 
transferred to Muslim countries. Lachenmann argued that Habermas had not really used the 
term of knowledge and neglected how knowledge is socially constructed and negotiated in 
multiple fora and platforms, which can all be part of a heterogeneous public sphere. But one 
should not reduce public sphere only to the transnational or the translocal, she continued. It is 
always characterised through difference and diversity. There might be different overlapping 
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and interconnected spheres. These phenomena can be studied with the analytical and 
empirical term ‘interface’ (Long/ Villarreal, 1993), where different social actors and systems 
of meaning interact and processes of negotiation about meaning take place. Research focus at 
the SDRC lies on analysing how this common knowledge or controversial knowledge is being 
negotiated and produced in the public sphere itself. It does not come from outside or from any 
undefined social position. 
 
Lachenmann stressed the importance of the concept of overlapping spheres. This concept can 
capture very interesting facets of social movements, like peasant organisations in  
West Africa, which has a large percentage of Islamic population. These peasant organisations 
are involved in processes of negotiation with the authorities of Islam or of Islamic 
brotherhoods about different validities of knowledge, in different spaces on different gender 
orders. Through these negotiations a public space is being constituted. Here the idea of 
common good (Gemeinwohl) comes in. It can be related to systems of social security or, as 
Salvatore argues, to reformist Islamic movements. Habermas said that in the bureaucratic 
welfare system the transformation of the public transforms citizens into mere clients of the 
welfare states. The question is whether the “public Islam” is really fostering sustainable 
systems of social security or only charity without entitlements and no active producers of 
welfare. In Sudan or Pakistan the classical Muslim tradition of ]DNKDW is now being 
bureaucratised and made practically a state tax or a system of taxation. The discrepancy is 
however that this is more or less produced in a very authoritarian way as a social tax, what 
can be criticised according to the ideas of authoritarian modes of governance (Mbembe, 
1988). To study and analyse the linkages between state and society is hence important. The 
connection between wealth and charity in the majority of Muslim countries can give a very 
interesting insight to the structures of public sphere in these societies. It seems that many 
Islamic associations which constitute public sphere or civil society do it through charity. But 
charity has a very authoritarian notion, where poor people and especially women are 
instrumentalised. Women and poor people are not the subjects in these processes, but seen as 
categories apart. Women are instrumentalised as markers of Islamic faith in a male society. 
And those who get charity are not subjects of civil society or public sphere.  
 
6WUHWFKLQJWKHKRUL]RQZRPHQ¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVRFLDOVSDFHLQ6XGDQ
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To understand the process of restructuration in the context of Islamisation, 6DOPD1DJHHE

 
developed the concept of Neo-harem (Nageeb, 2002; Nageeb, 2004), which explains the 
gender specific ways in which women experience the process of Islamisation. Neo-harem is 
the practice of intensifying the confinement of women to an ideologically defined space and 
is based on specific socialisation of women’s body and conduct, and on segregation of spaces 
according to gender. This practice and segregation of spaces, Nageeb stated, is instrumental to 
the Islamic credential of the state and the Muslim brotherhoods. Neo-harem is on the one 
hand restraining women to specific kinds of conduct and space in order to reflect the Islamic 
image of the nation and on the other hand it restrains women in their translocal visions and 
hence their ability to enter the field of social restructuration as a cultural force. Instead of  
following a rather impact oriented approach and interpreting Neo-harem as the end result of 
Islamisation, Nageeb suggested an approach that emphasises the negotiation processes related 
to Islamist restructuration and the way women take part in these processes and constitute their 
agency. This implies to interpret Neo-harem as a dynamic process shaped by change and 
negotiation. That means as well that Neo-harem is characterised by a peculiar complexity of 
structure and agency: it entails the instrumentalisation of women and the restriction of their 
translocal visions, but at the same time women continuously negotiate, change and question 
this institution while constituting social space.   
 
Nageeb stressed that she was using social space as a methodological orientation and 
approach, as a means of translating the everyday richness into academic text, but also as a 
frame, in the sense of orientation and social mapping of the specific location of Khartoum. 
This mapping works by conceptualising the field of study as arrangement of spaces. Some of 
them are territorial and physical with physical boundaries; others have situational and 
symbolic boundaries. But space is not only a methodological tool, Nageeb stressed. From a 
theoretical perspective it is also important to understand how space is constituted, especially 
because analysing gendered social spaces can provide the researcher with a pragmatic view of 
society and on how social change and restructuring are taking place.  
 
                     
2
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Nageeb pointed also at the empirical entrances that allowed her to theorise on the issue of 
space. One of the possible empirical entrances is the analysis of the way how time and space 
are compared and referred to in the narratives of the actors. Analytically, time and space are 
closely related to each other, because space is socially shaped and constituted and therefore 
embedded in time. Furthermore, for the subjects the comparison of their own time and spaces 
with past time and spaces or different spaces (comparative interaction, as Stauth calls it) is 
fundamental for positioning themselves in an increasingly globalised and translocalised social 
world. These kinds of comparisons are present in the everyday talks of the people comparing 
the present with the past, own habits with other, different ones. They obviously contain 
information about the past and about other places, but at the same time they express the very 
present and the very ‘here’. This comparative perspective is closely related to the work of 
Stauth and Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1985; Stauth, 2000b), who worked on subjects’ techniques to 
occupy space and to construct different views of this space. The focus on comparative 
interaction brings together different levels of cultural forces: local, translocal, past oriented 
and also future oriented. 
A second empirical entrance is the body and the position of the body in space. Nageeb makes 
clear that she wants to go beyond talking about symbols like the KLMDE or ‘beards’ when 
analysing the body. She instead refers to the body, to gestures and socialisation as a kind of 
practical mastery of the social field and its division. This can be analysed in everyday 
situations, observing women and their embodied practises in different spaces. For example, 
when a stranger enters a female defined room, women will immediately cover their heads. 
This can be analysed as a kind of practical mastery of the social field reflected through 
orienting the body. This reorientation of the body in everyday practices is very important as it 
challenges the concept of private and public as separate spheres, by showing the situational 
character of their borders. Nageeb claims that it is necessary to analyse the dimension of 
knowledge and how knowledge is activated in positioning a specific cultural signifier.  
 
The comparative perspective brings in the wider social reality, the transcultural dimension, 
the time dimension of social space, the body, the everyday knowledge and the positioning of 
the self in the social field. Nageeb approached the social space by grasping on the one hand 
the nature of the social restructuration as imposed by the project of Islamisation and the way 
this leads to a gender segmentation of space at the societal level. On the other hand, by 
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grasping the common sense world, the everyday social and symbolic interaction as shaped by 
the nature of social order and structure. Both levels, the processes of wider social 
restructuration and the everyday practices are being connected and brought together in the 
intermediary concept of social space.  
 
In her empirical work, Nageeb analysed how two different groups of women, one religious 
group, called the Mosque Group, and one Gender group, constitute social space and how this 
process of the constitution of social space is leading to social restructuration within the 
context of Islamisation. 
 
The Gender Group is a group of educated professional women, lawyers, doctors, etc. who are 
active in the field of gender equality, development, peace or environment or any of the global 
development issues. This group started in 1994 trying to get registered as a NGO working on 
social and development issues. Their request was however refused by the state, because at that 
time, the state was very strict about registering NGOs. When their request was refused, they 
decided to come together informally every 2 to 3 weeks to discuss the issues they were 
interested in. Nowadays, there are three of such groups in Khartoum consisting usually of 15-30 
women. They gather in what they consider an important female space of networking, of support, 
of strategising, of solidarity. Despite the fact that nowadays it is allowed to register groups as 
NGOs, the women are still keeping this space to contemplate and exchange ideas about certain 
issues. They meet monthly in one of the houses of the women. Each of them contribute 
something to eat and they spend 3-4 hours discussing topics like the Convention of Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), how to link with the network 
‘Women Living under Muslim Laws’, or female circumcision. These groups of women perceive 
the process of Islamisation as a politically dangerous project. They criticise the project as one 
which is based on an orientation to the past in the Arab Island without adequate consideration to 
the local Sudanese tradition and that the Islam of the Islamists became a political monopoly that 
hinders real progress and development. By the state these groups are perceived as Western 
influenced since they are also discussing topics like human rights. 
 
The Mosque Group is a completely different group of women. They are housewives who 
meet 2 to 3 times per week in the mosque to study the Qur’an. The teacher who leads the 
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group is one of them with more knowledge about reading the Qur’an in the correct way. In 
most cases, these teachers are returnees from Saudi Arabia. These religious groups see the 
Islamisation process differently from the gender group. They see it as a VDNZD, i.e. as clean 
and not dirtied by tradition. Tradition for them is not related to the true Islam. By the Islamist 
state they are considered as a good example and indicator of the success of the Islamisation 
process, since people voluntarily take to this kind of grouping and gathering. 
 
Comparing the two groups, Nageeb juxtaposed the vision of the Gender Group which is seen as 
Western and considers the process of Islamisation as a monopoly of the Islamist state and the 
vision of the Mosque Group which sees the process of Islamisation as cleaning Islam from the 
dirt of tradition. She could also identify differences in the ways the women in these two groups 
constituted their social space as political activists. While the women of the Gender Group could 
delegate certain domestic tasks to their husbands, e.g. to take care for the children when they are 
at the meetings, and in this way renegotiate gender relations and widen their own space for 
political activism, the women from the Mosque Group transferred some of their domestic duties 
to the mosques e.g. taking the children with them to the mosque and paying the Imam to take 
care of them. Doing this they transform the mosque through their physical presence.  
The women of the Gender Group come to their meetings dressed in colourful national dresses 
and beautiful tops. This reflects their ambivalent discourse on tradition and modernity. They 
emphasise the Sudanese tradition of being Muslim and doing this they clearly distance 
themselves as much from the ‘liberal’ women of the 60s who were influenced by the wave of 
Western educated people, mainly men, as from new Islamic practices like the hijab (new hijab) 
and new Islamic schools related to a translocal Islam of the state. Muslim Sisters have their own 
political agenda of authenticating discourse: Global issues like human rights are translated into a 
local Sudanese frame of how to be a Muslim. They reject the trans-local Islam of the state by 
emphasising the unique features of a traditional Sudanese Islam and of being Muslim. Besides 
referring to tradition, they still constitute a major modernising force in Islam, as they seek for a 
way of ending the monopoly of the Islamists through a new way of reading the Qur’an. They 
themselves are translocally connected with similar groups in other countries which are reading 
the Qur’an in a feminist way and seeking feminist contexualised interpretations. Through this 
new ways of reading the Qur’an, they confront the Islamic resources with new global issues of 
gender, human rights, and peace. They construct a ‘new tradition’ by using global development 
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concepts of human and gender rights to explain everyday life of Sudanese women, be it 
marriage, divorce, or political participation.  
 
On the other hand the women of the Mosque Group form their space in the mosque. Here 
they do more than study Qur’an. Their space is used for counselling, discussing gender issues 
or political issues, for example ‘September 11th ‘. The process of debating in the mosque 
transforms the mosque physically. Now most of the newly built mosques include a women’s 
quarter which was not the case in the old Sufi mosques. Nageeb visited 13 such mosques 
which have women’s quarters. They further transform the mosque by transferring the social 
events to the mosque, e.g. celebrating a woman’s return from Egypt. The mosque is thus 
appropriated by the women and transformed into a public space. 
 
3XEOLFVSKHUHVLQ0XVOLPVRFLHWLHV'LVFXVVLRQZLWK$UPDQGR6DOYDWRUH
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 started his talk by picking up several points from the former discussion. 
His point of departure was how to deal with religion and especially with Islam from a 
sociological perspective. Here the issue of ethnocentricity as discussed earlier comes in, 
because dealing with Islam, he argued, means dealing with Europe and the boundaries of 
Europe and with the question to what extent European social theory can claim the right to 
make and to command interpretations of different social worlds. Nevertheless he rejected the 
dilemma of being eurocentric or not eurocentric because he doubts that there can be a 
somehow generalised knowledge of what this ‘euro’ is centred on. He moved from the 
premise that he is not obsessed with explaining Islam as a religion from an insider’s point of 
view. He commented that the richness of social science lies in networking and interfacing and 
understanding each other coming from very different epistemological traditions. One way of 
networking can be the shared passion to re-problematise an issue. The issue he wanted to 
bring into the central focus is the issue of practical rationality which he saw as a recurrent 
theme in Lachenmann’s and Nageeb’s talks. This is a common topic that is also discussed by 
interesting writers of Western social theory. In several cases this interest in practical 
reasoning captures the fascination with religion or with something which is constructed as 
completely alien. Referring to Gramsci, Salvatore argued that one discovers that there are 
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social groups, like, as Gramsci saw, peasants in Southern Italy during the time between the 
two world wars, who are trapped in some kind of religious primitivism but who at the same 
time have a kind of latent passion for justice and also the capacity to construct creative 
collective action despite their very precarious living conditions. Here we see a sense of 
disgust which complements the sense of respect and which has stirred the interests of social 
philosophers and theorists while talking about religion and religious movements. This 
ambivalence can limit the scientific capacity to capture what is really distinctive in the 
practical rationality of the underprivileged classes. Yet he would distinguish this kind of 
interest from other approaches, as e.g. Robert Putnam’s approach, a quite well-known and
very influential scholar in conceptualising and re-defining concepts of social trust and social 
capital, civil society and civic action (Putnam/ Leonardi/ Nanetti, 1993). What he uses and 
what is captivating is a kind of North-South cosmology which can be applied in different 
contexts. Within the scholar’s dilemma between disgust and respect for such practical 
knowledge lies the conflict of several modes of practical reason which most of the times are 
based on actors’ interest. However, practical rationality does go beyond simple interests into 
an older realm which has been neglected or erased by the civil society approach from the 18th 
century to date. This older approach that fascinated theorists like Bourdieu and Kuhn, is about 
re-naming and re-framing the horizons of justice and ultimate goal of social action. This by 
definition is a contested field. In Salvatore’s opinion, one cannot speak here of negotiation, 
but rather of fights, conflicts and strategic withdrawals. These facets should be included into 
the notion of negotiation, as a specific kind of agency, instead of being collapsed into the idea 
of a socially responsible and interest-conscious agent like in the civil society approach. 
 
Salvatore argued that there are indeed two conflicting interpretations of rationality. In his 
interpretation the emphasis lies on traditions. He stressed that when he talks about tradition, he 
is talking about one type of practical rationality which is linked eminently and passionately to a 
notion of justice(Salvatore, 2001). He agreed that in everyday life this kind of justice is evident 
in social work or solidarity associations which might be found in different contexts and maybe 
sustained by a different kind of ethos of the common good (Eickelman/ Salvatore, 2002) which 
cannot in his opinion be integrated into the civil society concept. He went on to emphasise that 
this is just another mode of the civil. He gave the example of Reema Hammami, an 
anthropologist from Palestine, Birzeit University, who is researching women groups, both 
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Muslim and non Muslim. She found that because Palestine in the 80s and 90s has been the 
object of aid and intervention by international donors promoting certain NGOs which 
correspond to a certain model of civil society, a process of hyper professionalism developed, 
which at the end created an unbridgeable distance to the needs of the population. Whereas in 
Islamic networks, where women have played a crucial role, and in social associations run by 
women, there had always been a practice of sharing information about who is in need of what. 
Through this practice information is not just transmitted but is discussed and revised. This is a 
kind of social intelligence coming close to the idea of a collective deliberation. However, it is 
not a collective deliberation and a public sphere in the sense of Habermas. It does not 
necessarily produce the type of notion of public good that gets hijacked by the modern state. 
 
At this point, Lachenmann intercepted referring to the idea that Islamic associations are closer 
to a practical rationality and that through their specific ways of sharing information between 
different societal levels complex processes of knowledge exchange are promoted. This idea 
would exactly fit within the framework of development sociology about the construction of 
knowledge, critical knowledge and the conceptualisation of society from above. Moreover, it 
points at Habermas’ notion of the technocratic state, implicating that the development 
institutions would make people clients of the social state without taking into account the 
practical rationality or the life world. At the same time she opposed Salvatore’s viewpoint 
that the non-Islamic networks are part of a civil society whilst Islamic networks are not.  
 
Salvatore emphasised the he shared Lachenmann’s concern not to perpetuate this opposition. 
He gave the example of a current research project in Palestine in which he is involved that 
analyses what is specific in these processes of sharing knowledge and possessing knowledge 
by Islamic NGOs, but which is not by necessity only Islamic. What all NGO activists, Islamic 
or non Islamic, religious or non religious, share is their ability to observe society and their 
will to claim their rights. Doing this, they might fall into the trap of dependency on the 
discourses of Western donors and at the same time harbour professionalism in the sense of 
watching what is en vogue and what they can claim. Meanwhile they are prudent enough not 
to come into confrontation with the wider projects of the state, for example in the Palestinian 
case not to confront the military occupation and the Palestinian authority. However at the 
grassroots level there is the process of sharing these experiences of non Islamic and Islamic 
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women groups. 
 
From a theoretical position Lachenmann argued against discussing the public sphere or social 
spaces under the heading of ‘grassroots level’. This would not come up to the idea of public 
sphere. The problem, Lachenmann elaborated, is very often that women groups are taken to be 
only at the ‘grassroots’ and separate from the public sphere. In this kind of dichotomisation, 
women cannot be captured as actors neither of the public sphere nor of a civil society. She 
mentioned that the Bielefeld approach focuses on agency, i.e. on how social actors bring their 
everyday life into the public sphere. To use the concept of grassroots in this context immediately 
erodes the theoretical debate about the interconnectedness of women groups at the basis and the 
public sphere or civil society.  
 
Salvatore defended his point by saying that he does not see any major contradiction between 
the kind of networking and activities that women groups do and the concept of public sphere 
per se. It is rather the Habermasian approach that presupposes a higher level of collective 
deliberation, what means that it has to be rejected at this level. This partly stems from the 
debates of the 90s which tried to make the notion of the civil society and the public sphere 
more ecumenical. In his opinion, Habermas did not capture these different public spheres. He 
thus agrees with the early Habermas that the latter’s notion of the public sphere cannot be 
applied anywhere else or even have a capacity to be perpetuated in the future of European 
nation states and bureaucratic democracies as he saw them. There is a sense of puzzlement 
about how this can be adapted to the different realities. He however agreed with Lachenmann 
on Habermas’ view that civil society should not be related to normative values and that rather 
the actors’ perspective should be taken seriously. 
 
A question from the audience was posed to Salvatore concerning the kinds of rationalities he 
was talking about. Salvatore clarified that it is only one type of rationality that is the practical 
rationality in essence. This rationality questions the common good and tries to reframe and 
rename it or redefine the common good. There is a passage from the individual ‘I’ to the 
collective ‘we’, a passage from the ego to a collective will or the sharing of a common good. 
Lachenmann mediated against dealing with the common good as a ‘goal’. She argued that the 
common good is a frame of reference of how society should be, a kind of vision which one 
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cannot name a goal. The concept ‘goal’ is entailed in Weber’s concept of ‘Zweckrationalität’, 
which is only one dimensional and not at all holistic. Nageeb interjected by saying that directing 
practical rationality to the common good misses to account for how everyday practices are 
linked to civil society. Practical rationality should not conceptually be linked to the discussion 
about a common good.  

Salvatore emphasised that the core of the classic discourse about civil society is about the 
common good and that a radical change was only introduced when civil society was related to 
an emerging commercial and industrial society. It is this notion of civil society that is not 
universal. Therefore the latter and all other discussions can only be understood by reference to 
some notion of the common good. It is a continuous process, an adaptation and sometimes a 
clash. Andrea Lang4 went in to defend the notion of negotiation saying that when actors start to 
question the status quo, the taken for granted, then there is a clash. This clash can be an open 
conflict but can also take the form of negotiation. 
 
Georg Stauth came back to the notion of the public sphere and the civil society, pointing out 
that there is power and state and a kind of institution building and competition for it. He said 
that there is no concept of civil society if there is no access to rules. Lachenmann interjected 
here by saying that gender analysis looks at power relations and how one can access these 
rules. There is an interface to rule, where the analysis lies in trying to see the gendered 
structuration of spaces and the gendered negotiation of what means political participation. 
This is how at the centre the public space concept is used. She does not say that the state 
cannot intervene and break up everything. Stauth thereafter asked why Salvatore and 
Lachenmann were using the concept of power and power relations. Salvatore explicated his 
use of power and power relations by giving the example of Palestine and the research being 
done on Lebanon and the Shi’a networks around Hizbollah and other socio-political groups 
including militant women networks. These are all contexts where the inner instance of 
governance had been transformed by how the governance of international organisation 
complemented the latency or deficits of the state. He further explicated that he does not know 
whether the relative relaxation of the state that allows for the distinctive autonomy of such 
Islamic networks especially in south Lebanon will be a continuing or a stable factor. He 
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however agreed that through the relative absence of the state, the networks are now exposed 
to other instances of global power. These instances are interesting because here it is not the 
discourse and the funding which is limiting but the unpredictability of how it relates to the 
oscillating state’s determinations and power. What is more or less likely to happen is the 
encroachment of the state and then the game is over. Either the international organisations go 
home or they see the consequences of their actions and accommodate to the logic of socio-
political action of groups that do not fit the idea of civil society NGOs. But if they do so, they 
will have to face the reconstructed state, which, again, both their discourse and their funding 
patterns do not seem to seriously allow. 
 
Nageeb made an observation that she sees the mosques as independent spaces and not 
necessarily connected with the state. Stauth immediately came in to oppose Nageeb’s view. 
He stated that there is no concept of Islam beyond the state. The state encroaches even in the 
mosques and more especially when one talks about public policy. Public policy cannot exist 
without the state. He continued to elaborate that at the moment in Sudan as in Egypt there is 
no public interest that is not regulated by the state. Even publications for example newspapers 
have to pass through government inspection. Islam is concomitant with the state. He further 
supported his views by saying that he was speaking on the conceptual strategies and trying to 
link these with social theory. He was therefore questioning the whole issue of whether we can 
even think of a concept of Islam within this theoretical context and on the various levels of 
research beyond the issue that it has been part of a global track. Meanwhile this global track is 
vanishing or is being re-oriented or reached its deadlocks. At the same time, we can see that 
within the society itself we can witness growing poverty and more needs at the grassroots 
level. There is a threat of tradition or state control through needs. These needs means that 
notions of being clean, polite, civilising oneself through dressing is being threatened.  

Ikhlas Osman5 agreed that women’s activities in the mosques support even indirectly state 
interests. In the case these activities contradict the state interests they will be confiscated. 
Though at the moment many groups are acting in private they will be abolished at the same 
moment they contradict the state interest. Salma Nageeb defended her opinion that the groups 
will not be abolished, but will rather change their strategies. 
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Alexander Horstmann6 interjected that the early Habermas had been criticised for his concept of 
the public sphere. This ‘public sphere’ in the perception of Habermas was a kind of an iron cage 
where nothing could contradict it. However, in his later works he developed the notion of the 
technology of self, which can be compared to the notion of agency as discussed in Nageeb’s 
presentation. Horstmann stated that women are not representing an ideological concept of the 
public sphere but rather they are using the technologies of the self for discipline and order. 
There is therefore some appropriation. 
 
Salvatore pointed out the necessity to mention the conflict between theorising and 
conceptualising which in his opinion cannot be reconciled. He commented that there is indeed 
a separation of what he was trying to say and the technologies of self. He would rather stress 
the level of interaction which is produced through the motivational prism. He however said 
that he did not want to discuss this motivational prism. The circulation of power is very much 
between the self and a higher instance. There is a hierarchical instance which disciplines the 
self and activates the resources of the self. This higher instance might be Christianity, 
stoicism, or the modern state. These are the models which the ego-alter interaction is based 
upon which makes sharing possible in interaction. In other words, this is a plea to focus on 
technologies of interaction and not of the self, the latter being, if anything, inherent in the 
former. If we do not do that, we just duplicate a theory or a theology that is only good for the 
self-understanding of a society or a group, but not for social analysis. 
 
Lachenmann asked Salvatore what he meant by his concept of authority. She pointed out 
Salvatore’s criticism of Habermas saying that Habermas believes that everybody is 
knowledgeable in a public sphere. The question however is what the authority in Islamic 
knowledge is. Salvatore agreed that authority should be re-problematised in social theory. 
There is so much authority which is disguised when analysing collective deliberation or in 
situations of communicative interaction. That is probably the sense of “political spirituality,” 
as Foucault developed it. What makes authority basic in interaction and co-operation is the 
ambivalence of charismatic authority on the one hand and less charismatic or even pure 
contractual relationships or pure friendship on the other hand. Authority is mediating 
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relationships in order to do social work. For example in Shi’a women’s networks in Lebanon 
one cannot imagine the working of such networks without the authority vested in such 
personalities from Shi’a agiography like Sayyida Zeynab, a saint that is a model of action and 
interaction for social work. Interestingly, however, this type of authority is only mildly 
mediated by the clerics and is much more directly incorporated in their actions by committed 
women at various levels of responsibility.
 
3XEOLFVSKHUHLQ0XVOLPVRFLHWLHV
 
In his talk, *HRUJ6WDXWK

 reflected on the shortcomings of traditional modernisation theory and 
gave an introduction to the writings of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Stauth, 1998a). The rigid 
antagonism that had been built up by modernisation theory between traditional and modern 
society, locating religion merely in the traditional realm, cannot be maintained. Tradition has 
rather to be seen as a constitutive element of modernity, as it is one of the major fields in the 
construction of modernity. This criticism of modernisation theory led to a paradigmatic change 
in social science developing a new perspective that no longer focused on culture as a framework 
for modernisation, but would regard modernity itself as the culture of the modern world. This 
new perspective also includes a strong comparative basis, linking religious traditions in Western 
and non Western civilisations and perceiving them as competing concepts of sociality, with 
alternative offers for the relationship of tradition and modernity. Comparative studies of religion 
and cultures, of multiple modernities, as Eisenstadt put it, are an attempt to continue on the one 
hand what Weber once started with his sociological analysis of world religions and to promote 
on the other hand the idea that non Western civilisations develop separate and alternative paths 
to modernity (Stauth, 1998b; Stauth, 2000a).  
 
The debate about ‘public sphere’ and ‘public religion’ is based on a framework of classical 
sociology of modernity, which divides the social sphere into life world experiences on the one 
and institutional realms on the other side. Both spheres are linked through the process of 
rationalisation, as the individual through individual practices rationalises her/his life within 
the context of institutional and intellectual rationalisation and the enhancement for 
institutional rights. This divide of classical sociology can be observed in Eisenstadt’s writings 
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as well, as his major focus lies on the organisation of the social sphere concerning the access 
to power, that is the access to institutional and governance power.  
 
Stauth further stressed Eisenstadt’s critiques on the divide between popular and official Islam. 
In this argument the great variety and particularity of popular Islamic practices in different 
regions, due to the continuity of different pre-Islamic cultural traits and different historical 
contexts of Islamisation, are opposed to a text based ‘official Islam’ which is conceptualised 
as promoting universal interpretation in an universal language by a specialised class all over 
the Islamic world. Eisenstadt claims that this rigid divide is not maintainable, without 
however going so far to question the autonomy of the XODPD. Eisenstadt wants to rethink the 
divide of public and popular Islam in the sense that what was formerly considered to be 
‘public Islam’ comes out of the governance sphere and reaches the public sphere and is linked 
more to popular practices. But at the same time this type of public religion has only very 
limited access to central rule. Because of this limited access to formalised central rule and 
power, there is space for a public sphere within a traditional context of Muslim societies, 
which can develop a very specific vitality.  
 
Stauth puts forward the concept of an Islamic public sphere, since it is very progressive by 
creating a linkage between institutions and private life. Within that space movements with 
transformational character can develop. The specificity of the Islamic public sphere is the 
articulation of collective improvements, beyond the sphere of the rulers, never through modes 
of official governance. The sphere of Islamic groups is characterised 1) by an interlinking of 
private and governance spheres beyond face to face interactions in a Habermasian sense, that 
is  communication and discourse about ideas beyond the face to face interaction, 2) by its 
reflexivity through debates about the common good, 3) by dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion, 4) by the flexibility of its boundaries, 5) by the recognition of the Other and 6) by 
the stabilisation through independence from the political arena. The point that civil society 
groups do not have any access to official governance is turned around into the argument that 
within the realm of the public sphere actors like Muslim groups have the power to create a 
vibrant civil society that goes beyond the modes of official governance. 
 
Referring to Lachenmann’s anti-eurocentrism argument Stauth stressed Eisenstadt’s demand 
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to take into account the internal dynamics of non European civilisations and interpret them in 
their own terms. This methodological approach opens up new perspectives on Islamic 
societies and questions Western experience’s privilege of interpretation.  
 
Following Stauth’s reading of Eisenstadt, the relation between the public sphere and the 
political decision making in Islamic societies would be characterised as one of separation 
which leads to the internal return of the establishment of pristine regimes through the 
conjunction of proto-fundamentalist movements and tribal intrusion of leadership. 
Eisenstadt’s main argument is that societal renovation does not come through governance but 
through the internal return of the establishment of pristine regimes within the society. This 
permanent reinstallation of autocratic regimes can later on lead to governance building, but in 
the first instance it is independent from it.  
 
After having developed Eisenstadt’s argument, Stauth pointed out his major criticism of 
Eisenstadt. He firstly criticised the concept of a ‘Muslim society’ or ‘Muslim public sphere’ 
per se, as it ignores the existence of a secularised sphere with secular institutions in all these 
so called Muslim societies. Secondly Stauth criticised that Sectarianism and sectarian 
renovation is not understood as an inner source of religion for social change, but as an 
external intrusion within the tribal context, putting the tribal out of its military context and 
putting it into a pristine religious sectarian context. Although Eisenstadt has always put so 
much impetus on taking up the perspective of non Western societies in the analysis, this 
notion leads to an impingement of Western concepts and any profound cross cultural 
discourse is systematically eliminated.  
 
Stauth further criticised, that Eisenstadt is outdated because of his clear institutionalist 
background. The mere rebuilding of the divides of institutionalism does not take into account 
the power instances within the private sphere itself, as elaborated by Foucault. What Foucault 
made clear is that power does not have to be channelled through institutions within the 
rationalisation process. Eisenstadt’s research perspective that analyses exclusively the 
contribution to the reconstruction of power institutions neglects internal dynamics of the 
construction of power within different social realms. 
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Salvatore opened the discussion with pleading for Casanova’s approach (Casanova, 1994) 
which he considers more sophisticated in analysing the production of power in micro spaces. 
This has to be the contribution of a comparative theory as also Stauth suggests it. Salvatore 
stressed the ambiguous relation between public sphere and government institutions. Pfaff-
Czarnecka questioned the equalisation of tribalism and tradition with rural life and of modernity 
with urban life. From empirical studies in transnational migration one can learn, she argued, that 
diaspora groups in the cities tend to reconstruct tradition more intensively than the rural 
population at home, so there is no obvious break between tradition and modernity. Stauth 
pointed out that Eisenstadt’s basic interest was the urban intellectual, the positioning of 
intellectuals in the modern world and the question of heterodoxy and orthodoxy.  
 
Lachenmann argued against the dichotomisation of micro and macro levels and against an 
emphasis on cultural and religious boundaries between Western and non-Western societies. 
She plead for the focus on cultural interfaces, on modes of interaction and contact of Western 
and non Western societies, and on common knowledge. She furthermore criticised the 
orientalist tendency of Eisenstadt, which she saw reflected in his idealisation of tribalism.  
 
Stauth argued that the rediscovery of religion as a political force in the global world has to be 
seen as a critique of an over-secularised society and clearly threatens global peace. He 
pleaded for putting religion into its proper place, especially in the sociological debate about 
the public sphere. Religion has to be analysed within the framework of modernity.  It has to 
be recognised as a decisive power, and should not longer be ignored like in classical 
modernisation theory. The success of religion in the modern world lies thus in the inner 
construction of modernity and sociology. Both “God” and “theory” served as a black box of 
transcendence which legitimised the control of a certain class over another class. The 
transcendence lies in the fact that something which is no longer related to the immediate face 
to face interaction is used to control the behaviour within the immediate life world. The 
comparative perspective should focus on how this inner machine of modernisation works in 
different civilisations, without presupposing and articulating a clash. This should be the task 
of modern science.  
 
Salvatore criticised the strong impetus on life world, the potentials of the self and the private 
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sphere of a sociological branch, which he denominated post-Protestant. To think about 
religion merely as a phenomenon of the private sphere leads to a conceptual reduction of 
religion and hinders to explain the ongoing success of religious organisations as political 
actors. This reduction of religion to the sphere of the self however is a relatively late 
development, which is based on the assumption that social reality is shaped by individual 
interests and interests again are shaped by individual passions. This reasoning about the 
common good, which is completely different to his own position, does not take into account 
the institutional rooting of Protestantism and Calvinism, which was an unique experience of 
European Protestant countries.  
 
Finally taking the influence of the XODPD on the public sphere as an example, questions of 
power, authority and social hierarchies in the public sphere were taken up. Lachenmann 
defended Salvatore who conceptually connects authority and public sphere. Stauth stressed the 
changing character of such power relations by taking the example of Egypt. Whereas today the 
XODPD have clear formalised and institutionalised authority, in the 60s their authority was much 
weaker and fatwa did not have as much authority as it has today. 
 
'LVFRXUVHVRQ,VODPLQWKHILHOGRIWUDQVQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
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
 presented some aspects of her work on Bangladeshi migrant workers in 
Malaysia. She focused on the role religion plays in the migration process.  
 
The migration of Bangladeshi workers to Malaysia is a relatively new phenomenon, which 
has to be analysed in the context of the uneven economic development within Asia. The rapid 
economic development in countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia or South Korea, was 
accompanied by a shortage of local workers due to demographic and educational changes. 
Hence these countries developed into very attractive destinations for migrants, especially 
from Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. Historically, the main destination for 
Bangladeshi migrant workers had been the Middle East. In the late 80s however, due to the 
Gulf War and to the higher salaries paid in the South East Asian newly industrialised 
countries, the direction of the migration movements changed and more and more Bangladeshi 
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workers migrated to Malaysia. At the beginning of the 90s the Malaysian and Bangladeshi 
governments signed a bilateral contract to regulate and control the numeric transfer of 
migrants, yearly quotas were negotiated. Although the majority of male Bangladeshi migrants 
are still migrating to the Middle East countries, Malaysia developed into an important 
receiving country as well. For Bangladeshi female migrants Malaysia became the most 
important receiving countries because of the opportunities to get employed in export-oriented 
industries (Dannecker, 2001). The reason why the number of female migrants decreased lately 
was discussed by Dannecker in the second half of the presentation after she outlined the 
motivations of the male migrants.  
 
In Bangladesh in public discourse, in the political arena as well as in newspaper articles 
Malaysia is portrayed as a preferable destination for Bangladeshi male migrants because of 
the special brotherhood between the two countries. Recruitment agencies in Bangladesh as 
well as the Bangladeshi government are emphasising a special relationship between the 
countries based on religion. This discourse is maintained by the Bangladeshi government 
despite the fact that the Malaysian government froze the agreement in 1995 already. 
Dannecker cited newspaper articles to reveal this construction process and gave an example 
from an observation she made at the airport in Dhaka. There she observed a crowd of young 
men wearing T-shirts with the slogan “Bangladesh - Malaysian Muslim Brotherhood” on the 
front and with the name of the agency on the back. All of them were Bangladeshi migrants 
travelling to Malaysia. The information that Bangladeshi migrants are welcomed in Malaysia 
because of their religious background is also transported through the social networks of the 
migrants.  
 
Despite of these attempts to construct a common identity on the basis of Muslim brotherhood 
Bangladeshi migrants experience discrimination and stigmatisation in Malaysia. The 
interviews with Bangladeshi migrants in Malaysia revealed that they have the feeling not to 
be very much welcomed in Mosques in Malaysia for example and that the Malay population 
is not very interested in them.  
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Since 1995 the rules and regulations governing in-migration are continuously changing. Thus 
from the estimated 1 million Bangladeshi migrants living in Malaysia, 500.000 are assumed 
to live there without any documents even though the majority entered the country legally but 
became “illegal” due to overextension of their stays or the fact that the factories employing 
them were changing names. In the year 2002 an amnesty for all illegal migrants was issued. 
At the same time, however, the Malaysian government made efforts to expel all illegal 
migrants, with especially harsh measures against Bangladeshi migrants. 
 
Nevertheless Bangladeshi male migrants are still attracted to Malaysia by the image of a 
common Muslim identity, although the policies have changed making it even more difficult 
for the Bangladeshi migrants to stay and to find employment opportunities. The migrants 
developed several strategies to cope with the increased discrimination on one hand and the 
constructed image of brotherhood on the other. They are for example involved in complex 
processes of distancing themselves from other migrants especially from those coming from 
non Muslim countries like the Philippines, Myanmar, or India. The migrants try to stabilise 
their position in Malaysia by constructing boundaries between themselves and the other 
migrant groups and by emphasising the common religious basis with the Malay population 
and hence their closeness to the Islamisation process in Malaysia. At the meantime they are 
also constructing boundaries with regard to other local groups, like the local Indian and local 
Chinese population. Especially in the case of the local Indian population this leads to very 
conflictive interactions and negotiations. Not only the fact that the majority of the local 
Indians are non-Muslims, also the darker skin of the majority of the local Indians coming 
originally from the South of India is used by the Bangladeshi migrants workers as a means for 
distinction. To justify their stay in Malaysia Bangladeshi migrants not only use religious but 
also strong racist arguments to include themselves into the national Muslim-Malay discourse 
and to exclude the other ethnic groups, especially the local Indians.  
 
Due to the translocal media flows connecting India, Bangladesh and Malaysia these racist 
arguments become very important in the Malaysian local context. Hindi-Movies are very 
popular in Malaysia and Bangladeshi male migrants are being perceived as looking like the 
movie stars and are thus being considered as sexually attractive for local women. Although 
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this sounds grotesque, the Malaysian government has defined this fact as a social problem: 
the social problem of local women getting married to foreign, especially unskilled 
Bangladeshi workers. The Malaysian government for example has announced that 
Bangladeshi migrants are not allowed to marry local women. They face deportation if they act 
against this regulation. Malay women who get married to a Bangladeshi migrant have to leave 
the country if they do not agree to get a divorce.  
 
All these facts stress the very complex and ambivalent situation of Bangladeshi migrants in 
Malaysia and the contradictory use of religion in the discourse about migration, national 
identity and integration. Officially it is propagated, that Bangladeshi migrants are welcomed 
because of the common religious background, on the other hand due to economic problems in 
1997 and 2001 the government tries to reduce the number of foreign workers, including the 
Bangladeshi migrants.  
In the second half of her presentation Dannecker focused on female Bangladeshi migration to 
Malaysia. In Bangladesh the discourse about female migration and Islam is shaped in a totally 
different way. In this discourse in Bangladesh first of all a clear distinction is made between 
the migration to the Middle East and the migration to Malaysia (Dannecker, 2002). The 
perception of women migrating to the Middle East is completely different from that of 
women migrating to Malaysia. Although the government is generally against the migration of 
women, it is especially reluctant to female migration to the Middle East. Whenever there is 
any discussion about Bangladeshi female labour migration to the Middle East there is always 
the notion of the danger of sexual harassment and of male oppression. Whereas in the case of 
the migration to the Middle East women are constructed as victims, in the case of Malaysia it 
is the other way round. Here women are constructed as immoral and sexually active subjects 
who get involved with men of different ethnic backgrounds and who do not resist Western 
consumerism. Therefore hardly any woman who returned from Malaysia spoke open about 
her experiences on the contrary they tried to hide that they had been living and working there.  
 
In the narratives of the Bangladeshi women who migrated to the Middle East, religious 
affiliation and Islamic practices played a very important role. They often stressed that they 
have been in the heart of the Muslim world that they even have been to Mecca, which of 
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course is a great thing for women who have never been abroad. In the narratives of women 
who have been to Malaysia the issue of religion is taken up differently. They often argue that 
especially the Malay population knows exactly the rules and regulations of their common 
religion, but that it does not know how to practice it. They compared their own practices with 
those of the Malay population, without taking into account the different traditions and the 
influence that aGDW has on Malay Islam. Furthermore these Bangladeshi women are 
confronted with stereotypes about their non-Malay Islam. One of these stereotypes is female 
circumcision. Being confronted with these images by their Malay colleagues, the female 
Bangladeshi factory workers are getting involved into a translocal discussion about 
heterogeneity of Islam and Muslim traditions and practices. 
 
Through migration and the process of social change discourses of national identity and 
Islamic religion are gaining more and more importance. This is especially interesting in a 
country like Bangladesh where the national identity was never based on Islam or on religion 
due to the historical fact, that Bangladesh gained its independence from Muslim Pakistan, 
which was perceived as the last colonial power that occupied Bangladesh. To achieve 
independence from Pakistan, culture and language were used to construct a national identity. 
Especially in this context it is interesting how new discussions in the migrant communities 
but also on the local level in Bangladesh develop and change the discourses about religion. 
The fact that the majority of the migrants worked and lived primarily in other Muslim 
countries initiates new negotiations and also a change of perspective. 
 
In the discussion Salvatore highlighted the oppressive character of the Malaysian state, which 
instrumentalises religion and Islamic traditions for the production of state power, the control 
of population and the economic development. He also stressed the importance of the new 
dynamics which migration and the new religious discourses of migrants, e.g. about rules and 
practices of Islam, have for the creation of new local and translocal aspects of Islam. Pfaff-
Czarnecka emphasised the continuous play with symbolic boundaries in the context of 
migration and the importance of signs for constructing and deconstructing these boundaries 
again. Referring to these comments Dannecker stressed the constructed and strategic 
character of the boundaries drawn by the Malaysian government. Despite the historic affinity 
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with the Philippines for example, these migrants are no longer welcome because of their 
religious background, instead Bangladeshi migrant workers are favoured. This shift in 
migration policies is embedded in special features of a process of Islamisation in a 
multiethnic society. Muslim migrants and other ethnic groups are instrumentalised in an 
Islamist state project to legitimise and foster Islamisation. But of course the boundaries drawn 
by the government are not clear cut, as the discussions about the Bangladeshi-Malay marriage 
showed. On the one hand Muslim migrants are included and used as allies against the non 
Muslim groups in an Islamist discourse of the state, on the other hand migrants are excluded 
and stigmatised as enemies in a nationalist discourse. 
 
Other topics which were raised in the discussion were the relationship of processes of nation-
building and gender and the influences of migration on the relations between the different 
ethnic groups in Malaysia. Concerning nation-building, gender, and citizenship, Dannecker 
stressed the ideological interconnectedness of the three aspects and the instrumentalisation of 
gender relations for constructing a national identity. Concerning the relations between the 
different ethnic groups in Malaysia, Dannecker argued, that the immigration to Malaysia was 
not disturbing the ethnic balance. To the contrary, it seems that migration fosters an 
interethnic dialogue about what it means to be Malaysian. Migration caused a public 
discussion where concepts like citizenship are newly negotiated. 
Finally, Salvatore compared the Malaysian case with the discussions about migration in the 
Italian parliament. Here too, religion is applied in a very ambiguous way. On the one hand 
catholic migrants are preferred and not Muslims. On the other hand it is clear that also racism 
comes in, because Filipino migrants despite of being Catholic are not welcome at all. Dannecker 
answered that the situation in Malaysia is even more complex, because the formerly constructed 
common identity on the basis of religion is now being deconstructed. In the current discourses 
they don’t talk about a common Islam any more, but about an ‘Indonesian Islam’ and a ‘Malay 
Islam’. So the government tries to politicise differences within the South East Asian Muslim 
community for political reasons, in order to legitimise their stricter migration policy. And this is 
once again socially fragmented, as the Bangladeshi scholars teaching at the Islamic University 
of Kuala Lumpur are not included in this discussion. They are perceived as religious experts. 
 
  27
,VODPLFWUDQVORFDOLW\LQ(XUDVLD
 
0DUNXV.DLVHU

 gave an overview over concepts used in the Soviet time and in the era of 
transformation to analyse Islam. In the soviet time Islam was tackled first of all as ‘Official 
Islam’. ‘Official Islam’ was introduced by the soviet government, to cope with the unpleasant 
persistence of religiosity among the population of the central Asian republics and to control 
this potential danger. This was achieved by embedding Islam into Marxism and workers’ 
ideology and by institutionalising this soviet re-reading of Islam with the introduction of four 
official Mufties. The concepts of ‘parallel Islam’ or ‘folk Islam’ were developed to cope with 
the religious practices on the basis, with religious activists and dissidents. These practices 
were conceived as parallel structures and were repressed by the state in a Draconian way. In 
the era of transformation the concept of ‘secular Islam’ replaced the concept of ‘official 
Islam’, which is not used anymore. The concept of ‘Arabic Islam’, which has also come up in 
the post soviet era, reflects the activities of Arabic Islamic organisations, e.g. from Saudi 
Arabia, in the area (mosque building, foundation of madrasas) and is more ore less replacing 
the concept of a ‘parallel structure’. A concept used in the Western literature which deals with 
these new translocal connections between Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East and also 
South East Asia is the term ‘Trans-Islam’. Kaiser found it somehow tautological, because 
Islam is always ‘trans’ in the sense that the umma has no borders. 
 
Kaiser focused on the importance of political Islam for the constitution of the transnational, 
geo-cultural space ‘Eurasia’ (Evers/ Kaiser, 2001). Besides ethnicity, pipelines, and trade, 
Islam and modern Islamic movements are crucial factors that integrate, constitute and shape 
this transnational space. Yet the architecture of Tashkent, the capital of Usbekistan, where 
sovietic and Islamic symbols melt together in the urban landscapes, reflects the hybridity of 
this space.  
 
As a relatively young nation state Usbekistan undergoes deeply conflictive processes of 
nation building. In the discourse of the political elites three competing visions of the 
Usbekistan Nation State can be identified. These visions can be approached by broadening 
Simmel’s term ‘Vergesellschaftung’ to ‘Transvergesellschaftung’ (Kaiser, 2001). Firstly, 
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there is a vision of a ‘post-soviet translocality’, which is promoted by a group of politicians 
closely linked to Moscow. The promoters of this vision are bureaucrats, who were educated 
in the soviet system, trained in Moscow and speak Russian. In this vision Usbekistan should 
follow the Russian model of social economic and political development and maintain close 
ties with the powerful neighbour. Secondly, there can be identified a vision of ‘Turkish 
nationalist translocality’, which is promoted by a group of political elite, which maintains 
close translocal ties with Turkey. It is their vision to transform Usbekistan into a clearly 
secular, but Turkish nationalist Nation state, following the Attaturk model. The majority of 
the activists promoting this vision is living in Turkish exile and is using modern media to 
create a translocal political arena for their visions. Thirdly, there is the vision of a ‘Trans-
Islam’ or an ‘Islamic translocality’ which competes with the other two and which is promoted 
by translocally acting religious authorities. They want to establish a state following the 
examples of Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. These different groups and their visions shape the 
political landscape of the region and the competition between them can adopt very violent 
features, as the events in Chechnia show. 
 
Salvatore opened the discussion leading the attention to the ambivalent techniques of the 
Soviet state to dominate the Islamic traditions in the area. He pointed out that the goal of 
soviet city planing was somehow to empty the social space of Islamic symbols and practices 
and to fill it with soviet symbols. In the same time some iconic symbols however were 
maintained and instrumentalised in soviet arquitecture as markers of national identity in order 
to sustain and create the idea of a union of different nationally defined soviet republics.  
 
Nageeb questioned the validity of the concepts presented by Kaiser and criticised their latent 
ethnocentrism not reflecting the actors’ perspective. Thus they say more about the Western 
researcher, than about the subject of interest. Lachenmann as well interfered and challenged 
the term ‘Trans-Islam’. Translocal connections of Islamic religious experts have a very 
outstanding history. Therefore she suggested historically contextualised research about 
transnational or translocal Islam. 

To conclude the workshop several doctoral students of the Research Centre (Ruth Klein-
Heßling, Rosaline Achieng, Luise Steinwachs, Inez Kipfer, Hanadi A. Thaha, Ikhlas Osman) 
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presented their work and discussed it with Armando Salvatore. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of the workshop was to break the classic dichotomies of tradition and modernity, 
whereby religion and especially Islam had been clearly associated with tradition and pre-modern 
life. Rather, the growing importance of religious organisations as actors in the public sphere has 
to be seen as related to the inner dynamics of globalisation, and hence to modernity.  
 
Islam today is clearly shaped by global dynamics and fosters global dynamics itself. Women 
groups in Sudan create their own re-readings of Islam in reference to global development 
concepts and transform the social space which the Islamist state assigned to them, as Nageeb 
showed. Kaiser and Dannecker illustrated how ambivalently Islam is embedded into discourses 
of nation building in Central and in South East Asia. Both could show that the phenomenon of 
Islamisation is closely related to processes of social transformation, modernisation, and 
transnational migration. Furthermore it was highlighted that translocal networks of Islamic 
organisations have an outstanding history.  
 
Theoretical concepts like Habermas’ ‘public sphere’ were intensely discussed and criticised. 
Habermas did not take into account any notion of ‘knowledge’ and the actor’s perspective. 
Furthermore, his approach seems to be restrained to a specific epoch of European history and 
thus only partly useful for the analysis of current, trans-cultural dynamics. Because of his strict 
divide between the public and the private, the feminist critique of Habermas is still valid. 
Despite of these shortcomings the concept was supported, as it makes visible the intersections 
and interfaces of the state and non-state actors, as Islamic organisations. Salvatore stressed the 
importance of the ‘common good’ for all debates about the public sphere or civil society. For 
this purpose he linked practical rationality or practical knowledge with justice and tradition. The 
concept of ‘social space’ was promoted as a methodological and analytical tool to capture 
processes of social change in Muslim societies from a comparative perspective. This 
comparative perspective is useful to avoid the traps of ethnocentrism and to reflect on colonial 
legacies in a post-colonial world. 
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